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Agency problems in public corporates have been a hot issue for a long 
time.Earier literatures focus on the conflict between managers and shareholders.From 
later of 1990s,researchers pay more and more attentions to the agency relationship of 
the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.Though controlling 
shareholders have the advantage of monitoring managers,they are provided with the 
incentive and capability to expropriate minority hsareholders.It is said that the 
exisistence of private benefits from control proves the expropriation of controlling 
shareholders,and the size of private benefits is the measurement of investor protection. 
Private benefits of control is a new sight for agency problems reserch. Examing the 
situation of corporate governance in China,the agency problems mentioned above 
really exist.There are few literatures of finance in sight of private benefits of control 
in China,and much issues have not yet be addressed.So researching along the 
direction has not only academic value but also practical meanings . 
This dissertation contributes to study how private benefits of control affect 
corporate efficiency and financial development.Based on the 196 control transactions 
between 1997 to 2006 the writer uses the block-trade-premium method to calculate 
the size of private benefits from control of China listed corporations firstly.Then the 
writer builds theoretical models to discuss the effects of private benefits from control 
impacting on corporate efficency and financial development.The following emperical 
studys draw the same conclusions with the models.The conclusion of the dissertation 
is that larger private benefits of control indicate better corporate efficiency and 
financial development significantly. 
The major contributions the dissertation,as well as its innovations, are manifested 
in the following aspects. Firstly, the dissertation extends the study fields. The existing 
rsearches don’t address the relations between private benefits of control and corporate 
efficiency in China.And no paper focuses on how private benefits of control affect 
financial development witnin one country.This paper attempts to research in these 














factor, private benefits of control,with the macro one,financial development.In the 
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导   论 
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者与外部分散的股东之间的冲突。Shleifer &Vishny （1997）以及 LaPorta,  
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer （1999，后文称为 LLS，1999）等研究发现，在欧洲
及东亚国家和地区的公司中普遍存在着控制性股东，这些控制性股东往往通过金
字塔结构、二元股份（dual-class shares）等方式强化其对公司的控制，从而使控
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